A Resiliency Coordinator Against Malicious Attacks for Cyber-Physical Systems
Author
Abstract

Resiliency of cyber-physical systems (CPSs) against malicious attacks has been a topic of active research in the past decade due to widely recognized importance. Resilient CPS is capable of tolerating some attacks, operating at a reduced capacity with core functions maintained, and failing gracefully to avoid any catastrophic consequences. Existing work includes an architecture for hierarchical control systems, which is a subset of CPS with wide applicability, that is tailored for resiliency. Namely, the architecture consists of local, network and supervision layers and features such as simplex structure, resource isolation by hypervisors, redundant sensors/actuators, and software defined network capabilities. Existing work also includes methods of ensuring a level of resiliency at each one of the layers, respectively. However, for a holistic system level resiliency, individual methods at each layers must be coordinated in their deployment because all three layers interact for the operation of CPS. For this purpose, a resiliency coordinator for CPS is proposed in this work. The resiliency coordinator is the interconnection of central resiliency coordinator in the supervision layer, network resiliency coordinator in the network layer, and finally, local resiliency coordinators in multiple physical systems that compose the physical layer. We show, by examples, the operation of the resiliency coordinator and illustrate that RC accomplishes a level of attack resiliency greater than the sum of resiliency at each one of the layers separately.

Year of Publication
2022
Conference Name
2022 22nd International Conference on Control, Automation and Systems (ICCAS)
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