A Network-based IoT Covert Channel
Author
Abstract

Information leaks are a top concern to industry and government leaders. The Internet of Things (IoT) is a rapidly growing technology capable of sensing real-world events. IoT devices lack a common security standard and typically use lightweight security solutions, exposing the sensitive real-world data they gather. Covert channels are a practical method of exfiltrating data from these devices.This research presents a novel IoT covert timing channel (CTC) that encodes data within preexisting network information, namely ports or addresses. This method eliminates the need for inter-packet delays (IPD) to encode data. Seven different encoding methods are implemented between two IoT protocols, TCP/IP and ZigBee. The TCP/IP covert channel is created by mimicking a Ring smart doorbell and implemented using Amazon Web Services (AWS) servers to generate traffic. The ZigBee channel is built by copying a Philips Hue lighting system and executed on an isolated local area network (LAN). Variants of the CTC focus either on Stealth or Bandwidth. Stealth methods mimic legitimate traffic captures to make them difficult to detect while the Bandwidth methods forgo this approach for maximum throughput. Detection results are presented using shape-based and regularity-based detection tests.The Stealth results have a throughput of 4.61 bits per second (bps) for TCP/IP and 3.90 bps for ZigBee. They also evade shape and regularity-based detection tests. The Bandwidth methods average 81.7 Kbps for TCP/IP and 9.76 bps for ZigBee but are evident in detection tests. The results show that CTC using address or port encoding can have superior throughput or detectability compared to IPD-based CTCs.

Year of Publication
2022
Conference Name
2022 4th International Conference on Computer Communication and the Internet (ICCCI)
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